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Abstract 
To varying extents, the world one is born into does not provide 
equal opportunities. This study measures the extent to which 
survivability across the developing world is affected by factors 
outside of the health and lifestyle choices one can make: industry, 
foreign markets, conflict, and the demographics around them. 
These variables are tested for a balanced panel of 102 countries 
over 7 years, allowing country-specific factors to be controlled.  
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I 
Individuals, families, and communities may undertake a variety of activities to better 
their lives, if such are available. The notion of one’s life as one’s project reflects the world that 
most know in high-income countries. It is a relatively stable, peaceful world of careers open to 
talents. In contrast is the notion of one’s life as one’s inheritance—this is a world characterized 
by a seemingly unpredictable environment and the difficulties of maintaining a “life project” 
therein. This is generally the world that is beneficiary of a host of interventions—notably, the 
World Bank—which are active in the developing world to enhance opportunities for the worse-
off. But there are still significant barriers to wellbeing that individuals may have no control over. 
Higher mortality in the developing world reflects the increased risk of “life projects” facing 
interruption and chronic discouragement.  
Many communities suffer from persistent violent conflict, representing a potentially large 
effect on the mortality of the broader population. Sociologists and Political Scientists found 
structural economic conditions to strongly influence conflict.1 And while the number of non-
state-based conflict events have risen relative to state-based, those involving government forces 
remain the most fatal by far, accounting for 72.8% of such deaths between 1989 and 2014.2 It 
follows that government intervention has a substantially escalated outcome. This extraordinarily 
deterministic factor, to the extent that it affects a population’s life-chances, is naturally expressed 
as a probability. Thus, the first research question models mortality, and the second models the 
probability of a state-based battle occurring.  
                                                          
1 See: Daniel Meierrieks, “Rooted in Urban Poverty? Failed Modernization and Terrorism,” Peace Economics, 
Peace Science, and Public Policy (18, no. 3: 2012). 
John Foran, Taking Power: On the Origins of Third World Revolutions (Cambridge, 2005). 
Mike Lebson, “Why Refugees Rebel: Toward a Comprehensive Theory of Refugee Militarization,” International 
Migration (51, no. 5: 2013). 
2 Erik Melander, “Organized Violence in the World 2015,” Uppsala Conflict Data Program, 3. 
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The results reveal a complex interaction of variables. Trade and high-income trade 
partners have varying effects on mortality, but strongly affect state aggression. Demographic 
factors and unemployment increased mortality and conflict across each model. Section two 
provides an overview of the data structure, their interpretations, and descriptive statistics. Section 
three provides the theoretical methodology for nonlinearity, fixed effects, and interactions. 
Section four provides the test results, their significance, and interpretations. A conclusion 
follows. 
II 
Mortality fell drastically between 1967 and 2015. It fell the most for low-income 
countries:3 by 182.1 deaths per 1,000 to the current level of 283.8. It fell the least, however, for 
the next category, lower-middle-income countries,4 whose mortality fell by 136.2 to the current 
level of 222.9. These values remain very high compared to Lebanon’s lowest recent value of 
73.7. There are a number of other coincidences: the same group experienced 53,672 more battle-
related deaths in 2015 than the next group (upper-middle-income at 11,791); had 86.9 more 
people living per square kilometer than the next group (low-income at 47.7); and the middle-
income group as a whole exported 66% of its merchandise to high income countries. Together, 
lower- to middle-income countries are considered Lesser Developed Countries (LDCs). 
Demographic trends are assumed to strongly coincide with vital resources like clean water and 
sanitation that mitigate disease. A tighter labor market, represented by low unemployment, 
represents job opportunities that transfer into steady income and other market benefits. A high 
income export market and natural resource industry provide additional opportunities for 
economic growth.  
                                                          
3 Classified by the World Bank as those with a GNI per capita of $1,025 or less in 2015, according to the World 
Bank Atlas Method. 
4 Classified as those with an income between $1,026 and $4,035. 
Partin 3 
 
Mortality is expected to be shaped by a lack of opportunities one could use to maximize 
wellbeing: steady employment, a livelihood unmolested by conflict, resources unstressed by 
demography, and the fair rule of law. A panel was created to mimic that environment. The 
mortality rate is constrained by gender in the World Bank, prompting male mortality to be 
chosen due to an expected higher sensitivity to these factors. The political and economic 
environment is formed with: unemployment, GDP per capita, population density and growth, 
export opportunities to high income countries, oil and mineral rents, and a governance index. 
Uppsala University furnishes the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset, which provides “a 
conflict-year dataset with information on armed conflict where at least one party is the 
government of a state.”5 The dataset is incorporated into the World Bank’s World Development 
Indicators. Political rights and civil liberties are provided by Freedom House. The rest are 
provided by the World Bank.  
Although bias does not arise from randomly missing values, a balanced panel has the 
benefit of minimizing standard errors. Some important decisions were made to that end. Firstly, 
some variables could not be used (e.g. natural resource rents, poverty ratio, fuel exports, access 
to clean water) due to missing data. Failed states and those undergoing all-out civil war (Eritrea, 
Somalia, South Sudan, and Syria) were removed due to missing data, but their uniqueness also 
exclude them from the theoretical design. Then states with populations less than 1 million were 
removed. Many of these are small island nations that are heavily dependent on a single economic 
activity, isolated from trade, dependent on international assistance, and so on. Finally, once a 
time period was determined to have the fullest observations, a final few countries were removed 
due to their not meeting this last standard (Bulgaria, Russia, Myanmar, Venezuela, Equatorial 
                                                          
5 Therése Pettersson, and Peter Wallensteen, “Armed Conflicts 1946-2014,” Journal of Peace Research (53, no.5: 
2016). 
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Guinea, and Turkmenistan). The former restrictions were made on behalf of theory, so these final 
six countries are the only ones removed “arbitrarily.” A balanced panel of 102 LDCs from 2007 
to 2013 remains. The variables’ basic interpretations follow in Table 1, with summary statistics 
in Table 2. 
Table 1 
Mortality Mortality rate of male adults (per 1,000) 
B_Deaths Battle-related deaths (number of people, UCDP’s best est.) 
Density Population density (people per sq. km. of land area) 
Urb_Growth Urban population growth (annual %) 
Pop_Growth Population growth (annual %) 
Ex_HighInc Exports to high-income countries (% total merchandise exports) 
Unempl Unemployment, total (% of total labor force) 
GDP_Cap GDP per capita (constant 2010 US dollars) 
Oil_Rents Oil rents (% of GDP) 
Min_Rents Mineral rents (% of GDP) 
FH Freedom House (avg. between pol. rights, civil liberties scores)  
 
Table 2: Summary Statistics 
Variable Mean Median Std. Dev. Min Max 
Mortality 260.045 242.595 106.934 73.690 (Lebanon) 677.853 (Zimbabwe) 
Pop_Dens 108.963 67.531 152.448 1.669 (Mongolia) 1,207.320 (Bangladesh) 
Pop_Grow 1.772 1.701 1.165 -1.666 (Romania) 7.108 (Lebanon) 
Urb_Grow 2.763 2.826 1.698 -1.422 (Romania) 7.247 (Lebanon) 
B_Deaths 217.364 0.000 970.814 0.0 (Kenya) 10,165.0 (Sri Lanka) 
Exp_HighInc 54.269 58.788 23.832 0.0 (Botswana) 98.114 (Chad) 
Unemp 8.988 7.0 6.868 0.10 (Cambodia) 37.600 (Lebanon) 
GDP_Capita 3,235.90 2,237.180 2,930.550 211.022 (Burundi) 11,933.80 (Libya) 
Oil_Rents 5.981 0.153 12.861 0.0 (Burundi) 65.603 (Congo, R.) 
Min_Rents 2.658 0.481 5.858 0.0 (Afghanistan) 44.644 (Mauritania) 
FH 24.978 26.000 11.076 1.50 (Uzbekistan) 45.50 (Costa Rica) 
Battle_dum 0.220 0.0 0.414 0.0 (NA) 1.0 (NA) 
Note: These are for the original data and do not include subsequent alterations as found below.  
 
The panel structure introduces danger that a variable’s estimated value is strongly 
correlated with a past trend. The results of Augmented Dickey-Fuller tests are presented in Table 
3, testing the joint hypothesis that each cross section is nonstationary including a constant and 
one lag. The program could not conduct the test on B_Deaths because it is mostly zeros. 
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  Table 3: ADF 
Variable Statistic .1st Dif. 
Mortality -2.896** -- 
Pop_Growth -3.372** -- 
Density -3.096** -- 
Urb_Growth -3.331** -- 
Exp_HighInc -2.470 -2.974* 
Unempl -3.095** -- 
GDP_Cap -3.515*** -- 
Oil_Rents -4.921*** -- 
Min_Rents -3.611*** -- 
FH -2.857* -- 
***,**,* = 1%, 5%, 10% significance level 
 
The results that reject the joint null hypothesis prove there is variation across time and country 
for each of those variables. Conversion to first differences would make the variable stationary 
which originally failed the test, as indicated by the corresponding column. However, it also 
reduces the observations from 714 to 612, due to some differences becoming negative or zero. In 
order to maintain a balanced panel, the logarithm of Exp_HighInc was used instead, and is 
interpreted as the .01𝛽 change. 
III 
Methodology followed the goals of maximizing the R-squared for each estimated model 
and including the most precise specifications. For example, a cubic variable that is not 
statistically significant would be excluded, leaving the linear and quadratic. Beginning with this 
assumption, the specifications used are desbribed in their most general form below, along with 
the theoretical reasoning leading thereto. The particular models estimated from these are 
presented in the next section.  
It is predicted that the structural conditions do not impose a high cost on human life until 
it reaches a certain threshold. There is a boundary between moderation and severity. For 
example, a low unemployment rate signifies that there is just enough slack for firms to hire with 
discretion, whereas a higher rate indicates that many people are searching for work but cannot 
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attain it. Moderate population density indicates little else than an organized society, but 
decreasing returns to scale for benefits coincide with increasing externalities, such as resource 
and infrastructural strain. Nonlinear specifications of these variables investigate the significance 
of these dynamic relationships. A polynomial regression model estimates the nonlinear 
relationship: 
Yit = 𝛽0 + 𝛽𝑖𝑡
𝑟+ uit, 
where i = 1, …, 102 and t = 1, …, 7 and r is the power of the variable. 
In addition, there is reason to believe factors exist which do not vary across time. In the 
media religion is commonly associated with ongoing violence in certain areas. A glance at the 
Uppsala Conflict Encyclopedia map seems to corroborate this anecdote from the extremist 
Taliban in Afghanistan, to the persecution of Muslims in Myanmar, to the border between 
Muslim majority and non-Muslim majority states in sub-Saharan Africa. Strong religious views 
are almost universal to the sample. A Pew survey shows that respondents in LDCs 
overwhelmingly believed that religion is essential to morality, with slight variance among 
countries.6 These values may interact with others to create unmeasured cultural differences. 
These vary little, if any, across time, and can thus be assumed artifacts of the intercepts. This is 
estimated as a fixed-effects regression model:  
Yit = αi + 𝛽it + uit  
Alpha incorporates the omitted qualities of country i that do not vary across time into the 
intercept. The coefficients on the observed variables are thus the effect on mortality holding 
constant any unobserved variables, such as cultural attitudes. 
                                                          
6 “Worldwide, Many See Belief in God as Essential to Morality.” (March 2014). Pew Research. 
http://www.pewglobal.org/2014/03/13/worldwide-many-see-belief-in-god-as-essential-to-morality/ 
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It is suspected that trade partners matter more for countries rich in precious resources. 
Access to a high income export market ensures a higher level of confidence in a stable market 
over time. A country with poorer infrastructure and governance will have a harder time 
establishing trade relations with richer countries. Interaction between the continuous variables 
Ex_HighInc, Oil_Rents, and Min_Rents is tested by adding the following equation:  
Y= 𝛽0 + 𝛽1(Exp_HighInc) + 𝛽2(Oil_Rents) + 𝛽3(Exp_HighInc*Oil_Rents) + 𝛽4(Min_Rents)+ 
𝛽5(Exp_HighInc*Min_Rents)  
This represents the effect that these resources may have on mortality when the levels of these 
resources are also allowed to be affected by the level of relationship with the high-income world. 
Said differently, the effect on Y of oil rents, holding all else constant, is 𝛽2; the extra effect on Y 
given a change in both oil rents and a high-income relationship is 𝛽3. 
A second model will estimate the probability of state involvement in conflict. Given the 
prevalence of what may appear to be “missing data,” the variable may be more useful if all battle 
deaths are reduced to the value of 1. Creating a dummy variable out of B_Deaths enables a 
limited dependent variable regression model predicting the conditional probability that a state-
based conflict occurs:   
Pr(Y=1 | Xk) = ϕ(𝛽ₒ+ 𝛽it + uit), 
where ϕ represents the standard normal distribution function. 
IV 
 The results show the effect on mortality of the selected variables. The specifications 
described above are reported in separate columns in the below tables. For Table 4, the columns 
progressing from left to right are: linear OLS, linear OLS with interaction, nonlinear OLS with 
interaction, and fixed-effects with the previous specifications. Each column, then, is a different 
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functional form with the same base variables. Table 5 shows the difference in the probability 
model between linear and probit forms.  
Table 4: Regression Model of Mortality 
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Intercept 368.376*** 379.933*** 384.805*** 391.486*** 
 (24.597) (29.395) (27.369) (28.375) 
Pop_Dens -0.077 *** -0.076 *** -0.003 0.019 
 (0.015) (0.015) (0.040) (0.044) 
Pop_Grow 13.542*** 13.734*** 20.564 *** 21.296*** 
 (3.941) (.3.908) (5.955) (5.787) 
Unemp 1.522 ** 1.453** 2.512*** 2.582*** 
 (0.603) (0.600) (0.601) (0.573) 
lnExp_HighInc -28.990*** -32.083*** -29.650*** -33.825 *** 
 (4.494) (5.939) (5.461) (5.530) 
GDP_Capita -0.014*** -0.014*** -0.039*** -0.040*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.004) (0.005) 
Oil_Rents 0.782** -6.311** -2.259  .002 
 (0.312) (2.440) (-0.830) (3.518) 
Min_Rents -.883  -4.907 -1.635 -2.051  
 (0.532) (3.689) (3.830) (3.814) 
FH 0.505 0.521  0.751* 0.892* 
 (0.366) (0.370) (0.385) (0.465) 
ExHi*Oil  1.721 *** 0.838* 0.343 
  (0.601) (0.656) (0.837) 
ExHi*Min  1.137 1.061 -1.222 
  (1.003) (1.073) (1.069) 
GDP_Capita2   2.49e-6*** 2.60e-6*** 
   (3.67e-7) (4.12e-7) 
Pop_Grow2   -3.943*** -3.804*** 
   (1.162) (1.127) 
Pop_Dens2   -6.76e-5*** -8.66e-5** 
   (2.98e-5) (3.61e-5) 
Min_Rents2   -.105*** -.109*** 
   (.034) (.035) 
F-Test, linearity:    17.468*** 13.590*** 
   (6.73e-11) (6.97e-9) 
Adj/Pseudo R2: 0.316 0.320 0.362 0.465 
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Table 5: Probability Regressions of State-Based Conflict 
Variable LPM Probit 
Intercept -0.337*** -3.788*** 
 (0.072) (.500) 
Urb_Growth 0.113*** 0.551*** 
 (0.023) (0.142) 
Urb_Growth2 -0.012*** -0.061*** 
 (0.004) (0.021) 
Pop_Dens 0.001** 0.002** 
 (0.000) (0.001) 
Pop_Dens2 -6.12e-7*** -2.88e-6*** 
 (2.30e-7) (8.35e-7) 
Unempl 0.009*** 0.041*** 
 (0.002) (.009) 
ExHi*Oil -0.001 -0.007 
 (0.004) (0.011) 
ExHi*Min -0.007* -0.036** 
 (0.004) (0.018) 
lnEx_HighInc 0.076*** 0.448*** 
 (0.009) (.074) 
Oil_Rents 0.021 0.076 
 (0.015) (0.047) 
Min_Rents 0.029** 0.163** 
 (0.013) (0.064) 
Oil_Rents2 -0.000*** -0.001*** 
 (6.41e-5) (0.000) 
Min_Rents2 -0.000 -0.002* 
 (0.000) (0.001) 
FH -0.003** -0.013** 
 (0.001) (0.005) 
F-Test, linearity:  6.937 7.310 
 (5.70e-5) (9.05e-6) 
Adj/Pseudo R2: 0.097 0.122 
  
 Table 4 contains both expected and unexpected results. FH shows a positive relationship 
with mortality, meaning that a higher governance rating is associated with higher mortality, 
which is not intuitive. The most misleading result is for Oil_Rents, where the sign changes 
between functional forms. Adding the interaction clearly accounts for this. When the effect on 
mortality from changing both Oil_Rents and Exp_HighInc is added, it accounts for the positive 
conditional relationship on Y of the two, and the effect of a change separately from either of 
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them increases in negativity. This interaction captured the hypothesized relationship. The 
separate marginal effect on mortality of oil and mineral rents for form (1) is given by the 
coefficient of Oil_Rents, .782. For an increase in the share of GDP occupied by oil rents by 1%, 
there is an increase in mortality by .782 per 1,000 males. The partial derivative for form (2) adds 
the product of the interaction term and the share of merchandise being exported to a high-income 
country: 
∆𝑀𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦
∆𝑂𝑖𝑙_𝑅𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠
 = -6.311 + 1.721(Exp_HighInc) 
When Exp_HighInc is at its median (58.788), form (2) predicts a marginal change in the 
mortality rate of 84.863. 
Population growth has the largest effect on mortality. The nonlinear form (3) added 
statistically significant quadratic variables. The nonlinear effect on mortality after a marginal 
change in Pop_Growth is represented by the equation: 
∆Y = f̂(Xk + ∆Xk) - f̂(Xk), 
∆𝑀𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦
∆𝑃𝑜𝑝_𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤
 = [20.564(1.7) + 20.564(1.8) – 3.943(1.7)2 - 3.943(1.8)2] – [20.564(1.7) - 3.943(1.8)2] 
An increase in population growth from 1.7 (the median) to 1.8 is predicted to increase the 
mortality rate by 25.620. Each form improves the R-squared, and an F-statistic, testing the null 
hypothesis that the slopes of the quadratic variables are zero, is rejected. 
 Table 5 provides probit and linear probability model (LPM) forms predicting the 
probability that a state-based conflict occurs. While the two appear very similar, the probit form 
contains higher coefficients and a higher pseudo-R-squared. Urban growth appears to have the 
largest effect. The effect on mortality of urban growth at its median (2.826) is: 
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∆𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑓𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑡𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏
∆𝑈𝑟𝑏_𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤
 = ϕ(.551(2.826) - .061(2.826)) = .9162 
Including the intercept decreases the probability to .0094. The probit correctly predicted 79.0% 
of cases. Finally increased trade with the developed world is predicted to increase the probability 
of a state-based conflict, in contrast to Table 4. Min_Rents has the second highest direct effect on 
phi, .163(X)-.002(X)2. Exp_HighInc also has a positive impact. It follows that, although there is 
a weak relationship between these structural factors and personal opportunities, there is a strong 
relationship between these factors and state-based conflict. 
V 
 The results reveal significant barriers to labor markets in LDCs, adding another nuance to 
the so-called middle-income trap. The trade relationship to high-income countries is complex, 
providing opportunities for industrial growth with natural resources, but increasing state 
aggression. Unemployment and demographic factors are additional barriers to well-being. This 
study indicates that the primary challenge for governance vis-à-vis wellbeing is not just growth, 
but to manage the interactions between economic activities and to anticipate negative reciprocity. 
To wrest free of a middle-income trap is to potentially expose a growing population to additional 
constraints. Otherwise beneficial, an increasing rate of economic growth may provide negative 
feedback against the members for whom it should function. In that case, market benefits alone 
are not sufficient. 
 
